# SOCIALLY BALANCED CARBON PRICING IN LAC

Tessa Schiefer (Prof. Dr. Jan Christoph Steckel and Leonard Missbach)




## MERCATOR RESEARCH INSTITUTE ON GLOBAL COMMONS AND CLIMATE CHANGE

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
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### >> INCREASING NUMBER OF COUNTRIES CONSIDER CARBON PRICING

WORLD BANK - STATE AND TRENDS OF CARBON PRICING 2023



### >> FUEL PRICE INCREASES ARE POLITICALLY SENSITIVE






### >> WHO IS AFFECTED DEPENDS ON COUNTRY SPECIFICS

Vertical differences between poorest and richest households miss a large part of the heterogeneity.

Whether specific households are affected depends on their specific consumption patterns, e.g. do they own a car? How do they heat? Where do they live? etc. ...





### >> THREE DIMENSIONS OF DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS

Segment of Population	Criterion	Dimension of Distribution	Guiding questions	
The Lower-Income Groups	Distributional effects	Vertical Distribution	What cost falls on the poorest members of society?	
Hardship Cases	Personal effects	Horizontal Distribution	Which households face the highest additional costs? What is the cost to households which are most important to political decision makers?*	
Hardly Accessible	Procedural aspects + use of revenues	Possibility of receiving transfers from government	Which households could be compensated given institutional set-up?	

<sup>\*:</sup> Assumption: Additional costs matter to households and correlate with political support.



### >> HOW TO USE REVENUES FROM CARBON PRICING?



Equal cash transfers and distributional effects



Targeted cash transfers and distributional effects



Green spending and "issue-linkage"



Tax cuts -income, labor, and consumption



Corporate tax cuts



Public finance


Table 1   Recycling mechanisms ranked according to efficiency,
equity and acceptability


Recycling mechanism		Efficiency	Equity	Acceptability	Accessibility
	Labour tax (initial system non-optimal)	+	+	0	-
	Labour tax (initial system optimal)	0	0	0	-
	Capital/corporate tax (initial system non-optimal)	+	-	0	-
	Capital/corporate tax (initial system optimal)	0	-	0	-
	Directed transfers	0	+	+	?
	Uniform transfers (initial system non-optimal)	0	+	+	?
	Uniform transfers (initials system optimal)	+	+	+	?

Equity and efficiency are determinants of acceptability, but the evaluation of acceptability focuses on the other factors that determine it. We use the definition of optimal as given in the section on public economics. Plus (+) and minus (-) signs indicate positive and negative evaluations, respectively, whereas 0 indicates a neutral evaluation.

Klenert et al. 2018

#### >> CARBON PRICING INCIDENCE CALCULATOR









#### >> PROJECT CONTEXT

#### Target groups

#### **Objectives**

#### **Outputs**

- Ministries (Finance, Economy, Environment & Climate, Planning, etc.)
- Non-Governmental Organizations
- Civil Society

Support policy-makers in assessing impacts of carbon prices on different economic sectors and population groups

Model distributional impacts of carbon prices applying different social compensation mechanisms

Facilitate multi-stakeholder dialogues and knowledge management

Enable civil society to have access to information



Carbon Pricing Incidence Calculator (CPIC)



Policy dialogue, recommendations and stakeholder engagement

Uganda

Mexico



Dissemination





#### >> METHODOLOGY AT A GLANCE

Ю

/tCO2


We use household data on around 1.5 million households from 87 countries

Households report on consumption expenditures, differentiated by consumption items

We use an Input-Output model to derive regionand sector-specific embedded CO<sub>2</sub>-intensities

Next, we derive sectoral price increases resulting from a carbon price (e.g. MXN 735/tCO<sub>2</sub>)

We compute the total additional relative costs





### >> WE SIMULATE DIFFERENT CARBON PRICING POLICIES AND COMPENSATION OPTIONS

Carbon pricing policies	Coverage		
National carbon price	Nationally released CO <sub>2</sub> -emissions		
Global carbon price	Internationally released CO <sub>2</sub> -emissions (e.g. CBAM)		
National carbon price in the electricity sector	Nationally released CO <sub>2</sub> -emissions in the electricity sector		
National carbon price on liquid fuels	Nationally released ${\rm CO_2}\text{-emissions}$ from liquid fuel combustion (e.g. for transport)		
Compensation options	Intended use of revenues		
Equal per capita transfer (lump sum)			
Equal per household transfer (lump sum)			
Equal per household transfer (lump sum) Electricity price subsidy	Compensation proportional to pre-tax electricity expenditures		
	Compensation proportional to pre-tax electricity expenditures  Differentiated carbon price in electricity sector		



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Poverty and distributional effects of carbon pricing in low- and middle-income countries – A global comparative analysis

Ira Irina Dorband  $^{ab}$   $^{b}$   $^{c}$   $^{c}$   $^{c}$   $^{c}$   $^{c}$  Michael Jakob  $^{a}$   $^{c}$   $^{c}$   $^{c}$  Matthias Kalkuhl  $^{ac}$   $^{c}$   $^{c}$  Jan Christoph Steckel  $^{abd}$   $^{c}$ 

Analysis | Published: 23 September 2021

#### Distributional impacts of carbon pricing in developing Asia

Jan C. Steckel <sup>120</sup>, Ira I. Dorband, Lorenzo Montrone, Hauke Ward, Leonard Missbach, Fabian Hafner, Michael Jakob & Sebastian Renner

Nature Sustainability 4, 1005-1014 (2021) Cite this article







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pricing in Israel



Leonard Missbach a b Q ≥ lan Christoph Steckel a c Q ≥ Hauke Ward a d

Effects of the energy price crisis on

Jan Christoph Steckel, Leonard Missbach, Nils Ohlendorf, Simon Feindt, Matthias

Energy Policy

Assessing distributional effects of carbon

**European households** 

Socio-political challenges

and policy options



Double progressivity of infrastructure financing through carbon pricing — Insights from Nigeria

Ira Irina Dorband abd 🙏 🖂 , Michael Jakob ac, Jan Christoph Steckel ae 🙏 🖂 , Hauke Ward af





### >> CASH TRANSFERS IN THE CONTEXT OF CARBON PRICING REFORMS IN LAC

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Cash transfers in the context of carbon pricing reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean



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#### ARTICLE INFO

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Keywords: Carbon pricing Climate mitigation Energy poverty Social acceptability ABSTRACT


One reason carbon prices are difficult to implement is that they might imply high additional costs on poor and unlerable households. In response, studies often highlight that recycling revenues through cash transfers can render carbon pricing reforms progressive. This neglects that existing cash transfer programs target households from low-income groups imperfectly and that impacts of a carbon price are heterogeneous within income groups. In this study, we analyze if existing cash transfer programs can help to alleviate distributional effects of carbon pricing in 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries. We find that carbon pricing is regressive in 11 countries and progressive in 5. Most importantly, differences within income groups exceed differences between them. Beyond total household expenditures, car ownership and cooking fuel usage explain the variance in carbon pricing impacts. We show that households who are most affected by carbon pricing, some of them poor, do not necessarily have access to existing cash transfer programs. We suggest that governments aiming to compensate households should consider broadening the coverage of existing cash transfer programs, utilizing in-kind transfers promoving other distortionary taxes.

Can existing cash transfer programs help to alleviate distributional effects of carbon pricing in 16 Latin American and Caribbean countries?



### >> SYSTEMATIC COMPARISON OF VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS







### >> AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH FOR LAC COUNTRIES






Fig. 4. Expecting high additional costs and having access to transfers Share of population in 16 different countries that can be characterized by at least one of the following criteria: a) facing higher additional costs to carbon pricing than 80 % of each country's population (20 % most affected,  $HC_i^r = 1$ ), b) being poorer than 80 % of each country's population (Poorest 20 %, i.e., expenditure quintile j = 1) and/or c) currently having access to governmental transfers, such as pensions, cash transfers, or stipends (Access to transfers,  $GT_i^r = 1$ ). Numbers express the share of total population in each sub-group. Differences to 20 % for '20 % most affected' and 'Poorest 20 %' because of rounding.

#### >> AN INTEGRATIVE APPROACH FOR LAC COUNTRIES






Fig. 4. Expecting high additional costs and having access to transfers Share of population in 16 different countries that can be characterized by at least one of the following criteria: a) facing higher additional costs to carbon pricing than 80 % of each country's population (20 % most affected,  $HC_i^r = 1$ ), b) being poorer than 80 % of each country's population (Poorest 20 %, i.e., expenditure quintile j = 1) and/or c) currently having access to governmental transfers, such as pensions, cash transfers, or stipends (Access to transfers,  $GT_i^r = 1$ ). Numbers express the share of total population in each sub-group. Differences to 20 % for '20 % most affected' and 'Poorest 20 %' because of rounding.

### >> STYLIZED CHANNELS TO COMPENSATE HOUSEHOLDS WITH HIGH INCIDENCE

Compensating those households for excessive costs which	Countries where this is relevant	Examples of instruments to be considered in further research	Compensating those households for excessive costs which	Countries where this is relevant	Examples of instruments to be considered in further research
are relatively poor?	<ul> <li>Argentina</li> <li>Bolivia</li> <li>Brazil</li> <li>Colombia</li> <li>Chile</li> <li>Ecuador</li> </ul>	Lump-sum transfers     Expansion of coverage of existing transfer programs     Subsidies on subsistence consumption goods, such as food, water or housing     In-kind transfers (food, water, health goods and services)	use LPG? live in rural/urban areas?	Mexico     Paraguay     Peru      Brazil     Uruguay	Vouchers for LPG Exemption of LPG from carbon price Subsidies on electric cookstoves Provision of local public goods (health, education, water)
are relatively rich? own (and) use a car?	Nicaragua     Barbados	Reduction of labor or income taxes     Reduction of contributions to health insurance or contributions to pensions     Vouchers for transport fuels	use electricity?	Bolivia     Guatemala	Setup of (geographically) targeted transfer programs     Subsidies on electricity prices for consumers     Introduction of block tariffs     Incentives for energy efficiency
	Brazil     Costa Rica     Dominican     Republic     Ecuador     Guatemala     Mexico	Investments in public transport infrastructure     Subsidies on electric vehicles     Exemption of transport fuels from carbon price     Targeted compensation for car owners (and users), e.g.,	identify as ethnic minority? do not have access to established transfer programs?	<ul><li>Nicaragua</li><li>Peru</li><li>El Salvador</li><li>Guatemala</li><li>Paraguay</li></ul>	improvements  Setup of targeted transfer programs  Expansion coverage of existing programs  Setup of targeted transfer programs



#### Contact

















Find the Carbon Pricing Incidence Calculator at cpic-global.net

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