

Electoral cycles in Argentine local governments: An empirical investigation for the period 1983-2011

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Intergovernmental federal relations

- In most federal regimes there are three levels of government federal, state/provincial and local.
- One fertile literature studies inter-governmental relations. Most work here focuses on federal-state relations. Very little devoted to the local level [[Brollo and Nannicini, 2012], [Timmons and Broid, 2013], [Arvate, 2013], [Sour, 2013], Freille and Capello (2013), Cingolani et al (2009), Paniagua (2012), [Boulding and Brown, 2014], [Bracco et al., 2015], [Rodriguez-Chamussy, 2015]]
- Focus of the paper is on local governments as political units. Specifically, we look at their electoral history in democracy and examine determinants of reelection.

Why study local governments


- Electorally relevant → for state-level election (both executive and legislative)
- Local policy implementation → which and how much
- Federal co-alitional dynamics → Federal-state or Federal-local or both?
- Some public services are likely to be decentralized to the local level

Questions

- What are the factors influencing reelection of parties and mayors at the local level?
- Do local conditions play any role? Do regional/national conditions play any role?
- Do transfers from above affect the election outcome?
- What is the relationship between transfers and electoral outcomes in swing districts?

Some data

- Over 2200 (elected) local governments in Argentina. They are afforded autonomy by law. But they are not autonomous financially. Only 3 out of 10 pesos are collected locally.
- Spending accounted for by local governments stands at around 7% of total consolidated public spending –but it has been growing in last 10 years.
- Local governments in each province have their own specific regime –transfers, other relations are governed by provincial Constitution.
- Municipal governments are hugely heterogeneous across population, economic power, fiscal capacity.



Contributions


- Analisis of structural and cyclical factors behind reelection of local mayors.
- Reelection rates linked to individual, municipality-level, department-level covariates.

Data

- Electoral data collected from Cao (2001) for the period 1983-1999; PRINEM for 1999-2003; various sources for 2003-2011.
- Other data from Census data, Indec and province's electoral offices.
- 1816 local governments -we exclude governments from Santiago del Estero y Corrientes due to federal interventions.
- Eight elections for all provinces. Complete data (both *party* and *mayor*) for some provinces.


Reelection rates

Distr. reelection rates – Parties



N = 1299 Bandwidth = 4.575

Distr. reelection rates – Mayors



N = 1299 Bandwidth = 4.575

Figure: Density of reelection rates

Methods

- We build on a very basic model of reelection/no reelection by just including a binary outcome variable and two types of dependent variables: incumbency dummies ($pjinc$ and $ucrinc$ and political alignment with the state level government ($align$)).

$$reelec_{i,t} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 inc_{i,t} + \beta_2 align_{i,t} + \epsilon_{i,t} \quad (1)$$

- Difficult to collect data on degree of electoral competition and other political variables. We introduce a few additional controls for structural (economic and social) factors that may have an effect on the probability of reelection.
- Balanced panel with 10392 observations -1299 localities, 8 elections.

Table: Parties: Pooled LogReg and subperiods

	<i>Dependent variable: reelecpl</i>				
	All	Yrs 1983- 1991	Yrs 1995- 2003	Yrs 2007- 2011	All
ppinc	5.352*** (0.147)	8.075*** (0.718)	7.119*** (0.269)	3.374*** (0.199)	5.777*** (0.154)
ucrinc	5.653*** (0.195)	21.224 (390.821)	6.237*** (0.272)	4.189*** (0.291)	6.126*** (0.201)
align1	0.555*** (0.068)	-0.467** (0.185)	-0.626*** (0.171)	1.219*** (0.093)	0.673*** (0.072)
yr1991					0.129 (0.160)
yr1995					-0.119 (0.167)
yr1999					-0.092 (0.158)
yr2003					-1.216*** (0.169)
yr2007					0.619*** (0.138)
yr2011					1.032*** (0.132)
Observations	10,091	2,700	4,502	2,889	10,091

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table: Parties: Pooled LogReg, other controls

<i>Dependent variable: reelecpl</i>					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ppjinc	3.788*** (0.208)	3.923*** (0.212)	-0.226 (0.652)	0.988* (0.547)	2.088*** (0.678)
ucrinc	3.969*** (0.231)	4.179*** (0.236)	1.454* (0.818)	1.294** (0.547)	1.702*** (0.568)
align1	0.738*** (0.104)	0.786*** (0.105)	0.436 (0.525)	0.767* (0.451)	-0.745 (0.686)
popocup_dept	0.057*** (0.006)	0.094*** (0.009)	-0.085** (0.034)		
nbipob_dept		0.055*** (0.010)	0.019 (0.044)		
tottrfpc			0.0002 (0.0003)	0.00002 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0004)
align1:tottrfpc					0.008*** (0.003)
Constant	-3.663*** (0.267)	-5.775*** (0.478)	2.186 (1.787)	-1.359*** (0.130)	-1.366*** (0.137)
Observations	2,889	2,889	455	492	492

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01


Table: Parties: Logistic and GLME

	<i>Dependent variable: reelec1</i>			
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>generalized linear mixed-effects</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
pjinc	3.788*** (0.208)	3.923*** (0.212)	7.477*** (0.446)	7.465*** (0.440)
ucrinc	3.969*** (0.231)	4.179*** (0.236)	5.787*** (0.459)	5.837*** (0.462)
align1	0.738*** (0.104)	0.786*** (0.105)	0.192 (0.141)	0.185 (0.141)
popocup_dept	0.057*** (0.006)	0.094*** (0.009)	0.133*** (0.011)	0.157*** (0.014)
nbipob_dept		0.055*** (0.010)		0.065*** (0.018)
Observations	2,889	2,889	2,889	2,889


Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

iddept



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What factors are behind mayors reelection?

- On average mayor reelection rates are lower than those of parties. The mean reelection rate of parties stands at 59% while that of mayors stands at 47%.
- Other factors may influence reelection rate of mayors –the existence of term limits, furthering political careers, and other institutional constraints such as party primaries.
- Our data shows that the reelection rate for mayors in governments with municipal charter is only 37% while it is almost 40% higher (reelection rate of 51%) in governments without municipal charter.

Table: Mayors: Pooled LogReg, subperiods

	<i>Dependent variable: reelecM</i>				
	All	Yrs 1983- 1991	Yrs 1995- 2003	Yrs 2007- 2011	All
ppinc	0.503*** (0.067)	2.980*** (0.442)	0.977*** (0.099)	0.362*** (0.113)	0.459*** (0.088)
ucrinc	0.891*** (0.081)	3.022*** (0.494)	1.146*** (0.116)	1.418*** (0.156)	1.372*** (0.119)
align1	0.427*** (0.059)	0.288 (0.421)	0.451*** (0.096)	0.634*** (0.085)	0.378*** (0.069)
gendM	0.255*** (0.098)	0.080 (0.961)	0.565*** (0.169)	0.310** (0.129)	0.383*** (0.109)
cartaSi					-0.501*** (0.155)
Constant	-0.778*** (0.099)	-3.257*** (1.050)	-1.647*** (0.175)	-0.462*** (0.128)	-0.660*** (0.110)
Observations	5,848	394	2,663	2,791	4,085

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01

Table: Mayors: Pooled LogReg, other controls

	<i>Dependent variable: reelec</i>				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
pjinc	0.769*** (0.125)	0.824*** (0.127)	1.980*** (0.726)	1.986*** (0.626)	1.815*** (0.687)
ucrinc	1.204*** (0.143)	1.287*** (0.146)	1.845** (0.895)	0.969* (0.560)	0.909 (0.567)
align1	0.239*** (0.090)	0.265*** (0.090)	-0.503 (0.542)	-0.397 (0.475)	-0.158 (0.634)
cartaSi	-0.589*** (0.186)	-0.583*** (0.187)	-0.925** (0.449)	-0.925** (0.418)	-0.923** (0.418)
popocup_dept	0.044*** (0.005)	0.062*** (0.007)	-0.014 (0.031)		
nbipob_dept		0.027*** (0.008)	-0.015 (0.040)		
align1:tottrfpc					-0.001 (0.002)
tottrfpc			0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)	0.001* (0.001)
Constant	-1.978*** (0.202)	-2.978*** (0.356)	0.287 (1.635)	-0.479*** (0.138)	-0.487*** (0.140)
Observations	2,791	2,791	455	492	492

Note:

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01


Table: Mayors: Logistic and GLME

	<i>Dependent variable: reelec</i>			
	<i>logistic</i>		<i>generalized linear mixed-effects</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
pjinc	0.769*** (0.125)	0.824*** (0.127)	1.295*** (0.151)	1.302*** (0.151)
ucrinc	1.204*** (0.143)	1.287*** (0.146)	0.983*** (0.166)	1.001*** (0.166)
align1	0.239*** (0.090)	0.265*** (0.090)	0.040 (0.108)	0.047 (0.108)
cartaSi	-0.589*** (0.186)	-0.583*** (0.187)	-0.478** (0.204)	-0.451** (0.204)
popocup_dept	0.044*** (0.005)	0.062*** (0.007)	0.064*** (0.007)	0.073*** (0.008)
nbipob_dept		0.027*** (0.008)		0.023** (0.012)
Observations	2,791	2,791	2,791	2,791


Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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Discussion

- Preliminary results suggests that incumbency and alignment with state governments are significant predictors of reelection rates.
- As expected, mayors from governments with municipal charters have smaller odds of being reelected than those without.
- Structural conditions –ie employment status, poverty– does seem to be significantly related with the probability of reelection albeit mostly when tested over the complete period.
- Sizeable and distinct effects at province level –not so much at the department level.