Macroeconomics and Macroeconomic Policy from a Gender Perspective

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Introduction

The conventional conceptual frameworks and statistics used to design macro-economic policy are gender-blind. They fail to recognise that:

- women’s contribution to the economy is systematically underestimated;
- there is an unpaid care economy in which women do most of the work of maintaining the labour force and keeping the social fabric in good order, maintaining social cohesion, civic responsibility and good neighbourliness;

Looking at macroeconomics through a gender lens alerts us to the importance of non-market processes in the healthy functioning of an economy; and to the ways in which financial liberalisation places new burdens on those providing unpaid care while at the same time undermining public provision in support of this work.

Section 1 of this paper examines gender and fiscal and monetary policy. Section 2 examines gender and financial liberalisation.

Section 1. Gender and Fiscal and Monetary Policy

Measuring women's contribution to the economy

More of women's work than of men's work is not counted by national economic statistics because a great deal of women's work is not market oriented. We can distinguish three kinds of non-market work that women do:

- subsistence production
- unpaid care work for family and friends
- voluntary community work

Subsistence production is production for home use of goods which in principle could be
 marketed - such as food, clothing, soft furnishings, pottery, housing. In principle it should be included in the measurement of the gross national product (GNP). But in practice it is frequently omitted because statistical surveys do not properly count it. This is only a small component of work in Western Europe, but in poor rural countries it is very important. There is typically a social norm about which types of this work are done by men and which by women. In the UK, for instance, tasks that involve the use of power tools tend to be seen as men’s tasks, whereas tasks that involve the use of sewing machines tend to be seen as women’s tasks.

**Unpaid care work** is the work of looking after a household: cooking, cleaning, and providing personal care for family members and friends and neighbours. In principle, it is excluded from the gross national product: it is defined in the UN System of National Accounts as lying outside the production boundary. But it is vital for keeping the social fabric in good repair, and for maintaining and reproducing the labour force.

**Voluntary community work** includes unpaid activity in all kinds of civic associations, both secular and church based. It includes everything from self-help groups of mothers getting together to run a children's play group or secure improvements in neighbourhood safety, to support work for large international charities. Again these activities are in principle excluded from the GNP - and often are regarded as leisure activities. Voluntary work makes a vital contribution to sustaining the fabric of society, particularly the sense of civic responsibility.

Unpaid care work and voluntary community work can in principle be done by men or women - but these kinds of work have been socially constituted as more the responsibility of women than men in most countries.

As reported in the Special Issue of *Feminist Economics* (November 1996), a great deal of progress is being made in many countries in measuring women's subsistence and informal sector activity, so as to include it in the GNP; and in measuring women's domestic or reproductive work and voluntary work so as to construct a SATELLITE ACCOUNT measuring unpaid output. UNDP (1995) estimates that in developed countries women's unpaid work produces an output equivalent to at least half of GDP. In the world as a whole women's unpaid work is estimated to produce an output of $11 trillion, compared to a global GDP of about $23 trillion.

Neither national accounts, nor satellite accounts, in themselves can indicate what policies are appropriate. A conceptual framework is required in which to use them. But statistics are important for making inputs and outputs visible - without this visibility it is difficult to get them included in policy frameworks and seen as significant by policy makers.

**Conventional macroeconomic policy frameworks**

Currently, fiscal and monetary policy is based on a concept of an economy in which private production and investment is carried out by market-oriented firms. This generates cash income for the households which own, or work in, firms. Households then either save their income, or consume it by spending it on goods produced by firms. Households are assured to act as if they were completely unified, pooling their incomes and making savings and
consumption decisions so as to maximise the total benefit to the household as a whole. The role of the public sector is to levy taxes, make transfer payments, and provide public services. The economy operates so as to equate savings and investment, but not necessarily at full employment of those who want paid work, and full utilisation of the capital stock produced by previous investment. The extent which economies automatically tend to full employment is a matter of considerable debate among economists. But all are agreed that episodes of unemployment can last a long time.

In this vision, households do not produce. They are only consumers, whose function is to save or spend. The stocks of natural resources (or ‘natural capital’), of labour (or ‘human capital’), and the social framework (or ‘social capital’) are taken for granted and no work is required to maintain these resources. Non-market work is regarded for all practical purposes as outside the production boundary.

**Bringing a gender perspective into macroeconomics**

The conventional policy framework ignores non-market work, especially unpaid care work and voluntary community work. These activities tend to be taken for granted and not brought into the discussion of fiscal and monetary policy. They are often thought of as ‘social roles' rather than economic activities. But they are economic in the sense that they require the use of scarce resources; and in the sense that they provide vital inputs to the public and private sectors of the economy. Palmer (1995) describes unpaid care work as a tax in kind that is levied on the domestic sector in order to reproduce the economy, a tax that is mainly paid by women.

We can incorporate unpaid work into macroeconomic thinking by seeing national output as a product of the interaction of four sectors, the private sector; the public sector; and the domestic sector and the voluntary sector (see UNIFEM, 2000:26). The creation of wealth in a country depends on the output of all four sectors. Sometimes there is a tendency to assume that the wealth-creating sector is the private sector; while the other sectors spend what the private sector has produced. The four sectors of the economy are interdependent. The private sector would be unable to create wealth for use by the government and by families and communities, if the government and families and communities did not in turn create wealth for use by the private sector. In particular, women’s unpaid care work and voluntary work is vital for the creation of human and social capital.

Of course, there are important differences between being paid to look after old people or children as an employee of the public or private sector, and looking after one's own parents and children (for further discussion, see Himmelweit, 1995; Folbre, 1995; McCloskey, 1996). This is not only a personal difference. The costs of care of old people and children in the private and the public sector show up in the national accounts, and are taken into consideration in policy decisions. But the costs of unpaid care for old people and children in the domestic sector do not show up in the national accounts are therefore not taken into account in policy decisions. But this care imposes costs of time and energy on those who do it, and when those costs are high, the carers may be unable to absorb these costs without strain.
There will always be and should always be an important role for unpaid care. But if unpaid care is treated as a free good in limitless supply, there will be negative feedbacks to the private and public sectors, reducing their productivity and increasing their costs. The tangible signs of this will be work days lost and lower productivity through absenteeism, high labour turnover, ill health and stress. There will be underinvestment in human and social capital. However, conventional macroeconomic models do not capture such links. Research is under way to develop gender-sensitive conceptual frameworks and national economic statistics which can reveal linkages and feedbacks between gender relations and macroeconomic outcomes. (See, for instance, Waring, 1989; Cagatay, Elson and Grown (ed), 1995; Special Issue of Feminist Economics, November 1996; Aerni and Lewis, 1999; Alexander and Baden, 2000; Grown, Elson and Cagatay, 2000;).

In Western Europe, the public sector has nevertheless provided support for unpaid work in the domestic and voluntary sectors through public services and income transfers. Historically, the improvement of women’s lives has gone hand in hand with provision of such support (Folbre, 1994). However, this support is distorted and weakened by three kinds of bias: male breadwinner bias, deflationary bias, and privatisation bias (Elson and Cagatay, 2000).

**Male breadwinner bias**

This kind of bias occurs when public sector support for unpaid care work is constructed on the assumption that unpaid care is performed by women who are dependents of a male breadwinner. When there is male breadwinner bias, women’s access to social insurance, pensions, welfare benefits and public services tends to be through husbands. Married women’s income may even be aggregated with that of their husbands for taxation purposes. The counterpart to this is the assumption, by private and public sector employers, that typical workers will have little or no responsibility for providing unpaid care. This kind of bias is conducive to low labour market participation by married women, and the segregation of many women who do participate in a ‘secondary earners’ labour market of jobs with low incomes and few prospects. This kind of bias was common in the 1950s, when many European welfare states were built around ‘the worker and his wife and children’. By the end of the 20th century, it had been considerably eroded, with rising female labour market participation and a decline in the ability of households to enjoy the living standard they expect on the basis of just one wage. But it still persists in many European countries and is reinforced by the two other biases that were not present in the 1950s, but which gathered strength in the 1980s and 1990s.

Male breadwinner bias penalises women for their unpaid investment in creation of human and social capital by denying them social entitlements on an equal basis with men.

**Deflationary bias**

Deflationary bias is a bias that gives high priority to low inflation, low public debt, low public expenditure, low taxation and low budget deficits; and low priority to full employment, high public investment and realising the full potential for improvements in the availability of goods and services (see UN, 1999; Singh and Zammit, 2000). It is now deeply entrenched in the institutional framework that governs macroeconomic policy in many countries. It is
constituted in a variety of ways:

• central banks that have asymmetrical targets, so that they aim to keep inflation below a target level, but not above a target level;
• balanced budget legislation that constrains a government to cut public expenditure when the economic cycle takes a downturn;
• so-called ‘stability’ frameworks that incorporate rigid rules about ratios of budget deficits to GNP and ratios of public debt to GNP, regardless of the stage of the economic cycle, constraining governments to cut public expenditure when the economic cycle takes a downturn;
• rules about governments borrowing only to invest that allow only for investment in physical capital and disallow investment in human and social capital.

These rules deepen the global recession rather than aiding recovery. They undermine the livelihoods of men and women and throw people back into the non-market economy. Male breadwinner bias is often exacerbated through the perception that men’s jobs are more important, and women should be first to be dismissed. Women’s unemployment is thus often higher than that of men, while at the same time they have less access to social benefits. Women face particular demands to provide the safety net of last resort for their families, managing a dwindling family budget to feed and clothe their children; coping with the depression, ill-health and often destructive behaviour of men whose whole sense of self-worth was bound up in the paid job they have lost. At the same time, there are cutbacks in the public services and income transfers that would have provided some assistance to women in these tasks. The most visible cost of deflationary bias is the rise in unemployment. Less visible, but important for the longer run, is the depletion of human and social capital. Women do their best, but are not superhuman. They cannot fully compensate for the failures of the market economy and the effects of inappropriate rules for fiscal and monetary policy.

**Privatisation bias**

Privatisation bias is the bias that stems from the assumption that the private sector is inherently more efficient than the other sectors. It can operate through three forms of privatisation:

• complete privatisation, such as the selling of public agencies to private investors;
• partial privatisation, such as the contracting out of services from public agencies;
• simulated privatisation, when public services are compelled to operate as if they were privately operated.

The bias arises when faulty measures of ‘efficiency’ and ‘value for money’ are used; measures which do not take into account non-market costs and benefits; and which focus primarily on physical and financial capital. So, for example, measures are introduced to improve the ‘efficiency’ of public hospitals (measured in terms of monetary costs per patient) which have the effect of transferring real costs to households, increasing the amount of unpaid care work they have to provide. One example is changing procedures to shorten the time that patient spend in hospital, and lengthening the period of convalescence at home. This cuts back on the financial costs of employing hospital staff, but increases the costs of households (and primarily women within households) in time and energy spent on caring for convalescing patients.
Privatisation bias tends to intensify male breadwinner bias. One way is through worsening the pay and conditions of low paid women workers, making them more dependent on the income of a male partner. (The increasing ‘value for money’ that privatisation is supposed to bring is often the result of increasing the workload and reducing the pay and conditions of service of female occupations such as cleaners—see for example, Escot and Whitfield, 1995). Another way in which male breadwinner bias is intensified is through the privatisation of social insurance and pension provision. This reduces the scope for pooling risks and resources and vastly reduces the possibility of social cross-subsidy. It frequently makes women more dependent on a male partner to access benefits and penalises women who do not have a male partner with whom to share household costs. Private pension provision penalises those with breaks in their employment record and longer life expectancy. It is quite legal in most countries for private insurers to discriminate against women in the annuities market. The factors which lead to the disproportionate poverty of women in old age are exacerbated.

**Biased policies and false economies**

Deflationary bias and privatisation bias may appear to be sound economics if we ignore non-market costs and benefits. But the reduction in public provision that they imply is a false economy. Of course it is important to avoid excessive rates of inflation, excessive public debt and waste of public money. But in judging what is excessive and what is waste, we have to look at the non-market processes that create and sustain human beings and communities. A strong public sector is vital to mediate between the market pressure to treat people as mere inputs into a production process and the aspiration to live life in a fully human way. A diminishing public sector throws more of the burden of managing the difficult balance between paid work and quality of life on to women. It results in false economies, reducing financial costs, but increasing costs in terms of health, well-being, social harmony. We need to develop innovative ways of bringing non-financial costs into the frameworks that are used to set the rules for fiscal and monetary policy. But analytical innovation is not enough.

The problem we now face is that fiscal and monetary policy are primarily shaped not by elected representatives who can respond to the aspiration for a human quality of life, but by those who work in financial markets, operating with purely financial criteria and very short time horizons. This problem is taken up in the next section of the paper.

**Section 2 Gender and financial liberalisation**

**The liberalisation of the international financial system**

The international financial system that was constructed in 1944 at Bretton Woods was built around international flows of public finance from the World Bank and IMF, both of which had social goals specified in their Articles of Agreement. In the case of the Bank, reference was made to investment in infrastructure ‘thereby assisting in raising productivity, the
standard of living, and the conditions of labour’. In the case of the IMF, reference was made to the promotion and maintenance of high levels of employment and real income. It was a system with a degree of public ownership, although the voting rights were not democratically distributed. However, there was from the beginning a tension between these goals and the interests of owners of private capital, who were interested in maximizing the returns to their assets, irrespective of social goals. One expression of that tension was the shifting balance between automatic access to the pooled resources of the IMF; and conditional access, with the conditions reflecting ideas about ‘sound finance’ that required countries with balance of payments deficits to cut public expenditure to reduce these deficits, irrespective of the implications for social goals. From the mid 1970s, conditionality dominated and was increasingly linked to neo-liberal economic policies (Elson, 1994; Harris, 1988). At the heart of these policies was liberalization of international financial markets, first for ‘developed’ countries and then for ‘developing’ countries. It was argued that this would lead to the most efficient distribution of finance, but efficiency was judged only in terms of the use of marketed resources.

The IMF and World Bank as sources of finance became dwarfed by international banks borrowing and lending Eurodollars and petrodollars in offshore financial centres. For instance, Singh and Zammit (2000:1250) point out that between 1984-89 and 1990-96, net official capital inflows to developing countries fell by nearly 50 per cent, from US$27.2 billions to US$16.8 billions. In the same period, net private capital flows increased by 700 percent, from US$17.8 billions to US$129.4 billions. The most rapid increase in private capital flows to developing countries was in portfolio investment (bonds and equities), which was negligible in the 1970s and 1980s but which was US$51.1 in the period 1990-1996.
The Gender Implications of Financial Crises

International markets for money are inherently uncertain and liberalized international financial transactions are fraught with risks for which no objective probability distribution exists—such as currency risk, capital flight risk, fragility risk, contagion risk and sovereignty risk (Grabel, 2000). Information is necessarily imperfect and available information is unequally distributed. Such markets are argued by heterodox economists to be intrinsically unstable (eg. Spotton, 1997; Singh and Zammit, 2000). Periods of economic growth lead to exuberant risk taking and the value of financial assets becomes inflated. But eventually the growing gap between financial values and real returns leads to a subjective reevaluation of risks and holders of financial assets begin to sell them. Herd behaviour magnifies the propensity to sell and further stimulates the perception that risks have increased. The way is paved for crises in which the sudden drop in assets prices sparks panic selling; and the price of assets bought with loans drops below the value of loans outstanding, leading to collapse of credit markets and impending bankruptcy of banks and other private sector financial intermediaries. The crisis may be mitigated by intervention by governments or international public financial institutions to co-ordinate markets, restore confidence and bail out banks and other intermediaries. But such intervention can make things worse if the wrong advice is given and the wrong policies imposed; and bailing out failing firms shifts costs from individual actors in financial markets to other members of society. Moreover the expectation of being bailed out can lead to even greater excess financial risk-taking when the economy recovers.

It has been estimated that the average costs of government bailouts in banking crashes over the past 20 years amounts to about 9 per cent of GDP in developing countries and 4 per cent of GDP in developed countries (Caprio and Honohan, 1999).
visible costs are to the taxpayers who fund the bailouts, and to the people who lose their jobs. But, as pointed out by Irene van Staveren (2000), the burden of excessive financial risk-taking is also shifted to the people, mainly women, who provide the unpaid care that keeps families and communities going. Particularly in poor and middle income families, women are called upon to spend more time and effort in providing non-market substitutes for marketed goods that their families can no longer afford to buy, and providing substitutes for public services that are no longer available. In addition, women have to seek more paid work in informal employment, where new entrants making ‘distress sales’ tend to drive down returns. The burdens are thus not fully reflected in the GDP statistics but show up also in the additional stress and tiredness and ill-health.

Though the costs of the risks inherent in liberalized financial markets are shifted to women, as provisioners of last resort, women play little role in the governance of financial markets (van Staveren, 2000). Of course most men play little role either. Decisions about fiscal and monetary policy, about the rules governing financial markets, about corporate accountability, are taken by a small group of officials, politicians, and financiers with little participation of citizens or their elected representatives. The IMF (with guidance from the US Treasury) plays the key role in determining how the burdens of a crisis should be shared.

**Gender and the Asian Financial Crisis**

Attempts by the IFIs to manage the Asian financial crisis have been widely regarded as unsuccessful, not only by those outside the IFIs but also by some who were inside them at the time, most notably Joe Stiglitz, then the Chief Economic Adviser at the World Bank (Stiglitz, 1998, 2000). The IMF in particular has been widely criticized for giving the wrong advice and imposing the wrong policies during the Asian financial crisis. It imposed cuts in public expenditure though the underlying problem was not a budget deficit; and instead of
drawing attention to the strong real economies of most of the afflicted countries, it emphasized the need for much more thorough liberalisation of markets and major changes in corporate governance, doing nothing to restore confidence among panicking investors. In the view of Singh and Zammit (2000:1255), ‘a relatively tractable liquidity problem was thus turned into a massive solvency crisis, with enormous losses in employment and output.’ There was also a substantial increase in poverty, reduced public services and increased social stress (UNDP, 1999:40).

As yet a comprehensive study of the gender impact of the crisis is lacking. But detailed studies of survey data in both Indonesia and the Philippines show that as men became unemployed, the amount of work done by women increased, as women took up the role of provider of last resort. For Indonesia, relevant data is available from the Indonesia Family Life Surveys, which covered more than 30,000 people in 1997/early 1998 and a follow up survey of a 25 per cent sample in late 1998. Using this source, Frankenberg, Thomas and Beegle (1999) calculate the percentage of the labour force employed in paid work in 1997 and 1998 and show that for men it decreased by 1.3 per cent, while for women it increased by 1 per cent. When unpaid work is also included, there is an increase for both men and women, but for men the increase is only 1.3 per cent, while for women it is 7 per cent. A nationally representative survey conducted by the Indonesian statistical office sixteen months after the onset of the crisis reveals the household coping strategies underlying these figures - especially increasing the labour market participation of older married women with children and producing more goods for home consumption (de la Rocha, 2000)

In the case of the Philippines, Lim (2000) using data from the Labor Force Survey shows that both male and female unemployment rates rose between 1997 and 1998: for men from 7.5 per cent to 9.5 per cent and for women from 8.5 per cent to 9.9 per cent. However mean
weekly work hours for those employed moved in opposite directions for men and women, with those of men falling while those of women rose. Among the factors that may explain the increase for women is an increase in the hours of work undertaken by home based women working on subcontract (Ofreneo, Lim and Gula, 1999). This increase in the average hours that women spend in paid work has occurred in a context in which women typically spend almost 8 hours a day on housekeeping and child care compared about 2 and a half hours for men (UNDP, 1997).

In S. Korea, it was women who lost jobs more than men. Between 1997 and 1998, data from the National Statistical Office show that employment declined by 3.8 per cent for men and 7.1 per cent for women (Lee and Rhee, 1999). In response, the Korean government promoted a national campaign under the slogan ‘Get Your Husband Energized’, calling on women to provide support for husbands who were depressed due to unemployment or bankruptcy - husbands were not called upon to provide reciprocal support for wives (Tauli-Korpuz, 1998).

**Gender Equality and Reform of the International Financial System**

The financial crises have lead to calls from orthodox economists for a continuation of financial liberalisation but with more international surveillance of the fiscal and monetary policies of governments. An alternative approach is the creation of new international institutions to regulate global finance. For instance, Eatwell and Taylor (1998) call for the setting up of a World Financial Authority (WFA) to manage systemic risk and pursue both financial targets and social goals such as high rates of growth and employment. It would develop and impose regulations and co-ordinate national monetary policies. The IMF and World Bank would both have roles to play, under the supervision of the WFA which would have the responsibility of ensuring their transparency and accountability. Eatwell and Taylor are among those economists
who are concerned that financial liberalization has imposed macroeconomic policies that keep employment and output below their potential and the WFA is supposed to prevent this from happening. In the terminology used in section 1 of this paper, Eatwell and Taylor seek to eliminate deflationary bias.

So to do Singh and Zammit (2000), who are particularly concerned with developing countries. Full employment is the best safety net, they say. In their view developing countries must be allowed the option of maintaining capital controls. ‘The right to control capital flows must be the linchpin of any reform of the international financial system from the perspective of developing countries.’ (p.1264). In addition mechanisms are needed for more equitable sharing of the burden of bad debt between international creditors and debtors in developing countries. They argue that reforming the international economic system so as to promote growth of production and employment on a sustainable basis would benefit both men and women, but that women derive even greater benefits since they bear so many of the costs of instability.

Avoidance of deflationary bias is, however, necessary but not sufficient. As Aslanbeigui and Summerfield (2000) point out, growth of GNP and increased paid employment can have different implications for men and women. To use the terminology of section 1, full employment can be subject to ‘male breadwinner bias’. Controls on international movements of capital are quite compatible with patriarchal control of women. The so-called ‘golden age’ of full employment and rapid growth in the OECD countries in the 1950s and 60s was characterized by both kinds of control. Women were supposed to be fulltime housewives. Any new financial architecture must guard against male breadwinner bias as well as deflationary bias. This means that there must be other targets besides that of full employment.

Employment targets must be complemented by targets for an equitable balance between work and family life; and state-based entitlements for the providers of unpaid care
work as citizens in their own right (e.g., pension credits for time out of the labour market for care responsibilities). This suggests that a target of full employment needs to be supplemented by a target of family-friendly decent jobs on comparable terms for both men and women. Just as research was done in the 1940s to define and measure employment and unemployment, research now needs to be done on identifying components of decent, family-friendly work, and constructing an index which measure how far men and women have this kind of employment. Targets for this kind of employment will be easier to reach, and a good balance between paid work and the rest of life will be easier to achieve if privatisation bias is also eliminated. This requires introduction of a target of zero transfer of non-financial costs to employees and users of privatised facilities, to set along side targets for value for money.

Citizens’ dialogue on macroeconomic policy

A new policy framework needs more than capital controls and additional targets and indicators. In particular, it needs to facilitate a citizens’ dialogue about alternative macroeconomic policies. The ability of different interests to exercise ‘voice’ on macroeconomic policy is foreclosed not by the technical requirements but by fear of pre-emptive exercise of the ‘exit’ option by financial institutions. Their ability to exit rather than join in a dialogue is, of course, a result of the openness of capital markets. Ironically the openness of capital markets is conducive to an absence of openness in policy discussion, for fear that the wrong signals will be sent and the volatile ‘sentiment’ of capital markets will be disturbed. It is difficult to conduct a participatory consultation on when some of the key players have no stake in the outcome beyond the next few hours. A neglected argument for some form of capital controls is to ensure that financial institutions have more incentive to engage in discussions with other social interests in the country whose financial instruments they have purchased, and to prevent them from foreclosing discussion by a pre-emptive exit (Elson and Cagatay, 2000).
An example of what might be aspired to at national level is provided by the Canadian Alternative Federal Budget exercise, in which a large number of Canadian civil society groups have joined together to produce an alternative budget. It incorporates an alternative financial policy, including different types of linkage between global, national and local levels of finance and budgeting (Loxley, 1999).

The AFB was first drawn up in 1995 and since then it has become an annual exercise. The initial purpose of the exercise was to challenge the budgets of the federal government which were based on public sector downsizing in order to reduce the Canadian budget deficit from five percent of GDP to a target of three percent. Federal government debt and the high cost of servicing this debt were the factors underlying the federal budget deficit, which the government argued to be unsustainable.

The macroeconomic framework of the AFB reversed the government’s macroeconomic framework by arguing that the high cost of debt service was due to the financial policy pursued by the government through the Bank of Canada. The AFB accepted the importance of reducing the deficit but proposed a different route, arguing that reducing interest rates would be vital both for closing the deficit and a reduction in the rate of unemployment. The AFB recommended measures that would allow for an easier monetary policy in order to reduce interest rates, including a reintroduction of reserve requirements for banks and a requirement for the Bank of Canada to hold more federal government debt. The AFB also recommended some forms of capital control in order to reduce Canada’s vulnerability to volatility in capital flows. These forms of capital control included a surtax on Canadian interest earnings on overseas bonds, promotion of the ‘Tobin tax’ on international financial transactions, and a requirement by financial institutions to invest a minimum amount of their assets in community and small business development.
On the expenditure side, the AFB stressed strengthening and restructuring of social programs via social investment funds in the areas of health, unemployment insurance, income security, child care, retirement income, post-secondary education and housing. The AFB aimed to reduce male breadwinner bias by improving women’s entitlements in areas such as child-care, unemployment insurance and pensions.

Most of the funding (about 70 percent) for the AFB was projected to result from increased growth of the economy, while the remaining balance would come from a revamping of the Canadian tax system by raising taxes on corporations and wealthy individuals, while at the same time reducing them on low income earners. An example of such increased taxation on wealthy individuals was the introduction of a wealth transfer tax on transfers in excess of one million Canadian dollars. The AFB also promoted green taxation for protection of the environment. All the measures and proposals contained in the AFB combat the three biases elaborated above: deflationary bias, male breadwinner bias and commodification bias.

Though the AFB remains a civil society exercise and has not been implemented, it provides a valuable benchmark against which the Canadian Federal Budget can be measured. It would be good to see a similar exercise in Europe.

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